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1.  Introduction 
 
Recent studies on interrogatives indicate that some question embedding 
predicates (QEPs) cannot support strongly exhaustive inferences, contra 
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) (c.f. Berman 1991, Heim 1994, Sharvit 2002). 
Some verbs that support strongly exhaustive inferences are know, find out, and 
wonder. Among the predicates that can only support weakly exhaustive inferences 
we find verbs like surprise, disappoint, realize, and predict n% correctly. 
  Previous views on this problem encode the above distinction either in 
different lexical semantic properties (see Beck and Rullmann 1999 and Sharvit 
2002) or in different selectional restrictions of different QEPs (see Guerzoni 
2003), but provide no independent motivation for either. 
    This paper proposes a pragmatic account that improves on the existing 
proposals in two respects. On the one hand, it provides the independent 
motivation for the classification of different QEPs, which was missing from 
earlier approaches. On the other hand, it offers an understanding of a seemingly 
unrelated long lasting puzzle; that is the impossibility for predicates like surprise, 
disappoint, realize, anticipate etc. to embed whether-complements (c.f. Karttunen 
1977, Lahiri 1991, Guerzoni 2003, Guerzoni & Sharvit 2006). The remainder of 
this section briefly introduces the notions of weak and strong exhaustivity. 
  
1.1  The Weak vs. Strong Exhaustivity Distinction  
 
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) observe that QEPs like know support both 
weakly and strongly exhaustive inferences. An example of a weakly exhaustive 
inference is given in (1); an example of strongly exhaustive inference, in (2).  
 
(1)  Mary knows who was at the party last night. 
John was at the party last night. 
   
  Mary knows that John was at the party last night. 
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(2)  Mary knows who was at the party last night. 
  John wasn’t at the party last night. 
   
  Mary knows that John wasn’t at the party last night 
 
In general, an attribution of weakly exhaustive knowledge to Mary relative to who 
was at the party last night would merely amount to (3), which  attributes to Mary 
the belief that all those who where at the party were indeed at the party.   
Crucially, this alone is compatible with Mary mistakenly believing that someone 
was at the party who in fact wasn't.  
 
(3)  For every x in the domain of quantification, if x was at the party Mary 
knows that x was at the party. 
 
An attribution of strong exhaustive knowledge, instead, amounts to (4) below, 
which is incompatible with the possibility of Mary mistakenly believing that 
someone was at the party, if (s)he wasn’t. 
    
(4)  For every x in the domain of discourse, Mary knows whether x was at  
  the party last night . 
 
Another way Groenendijk and Stokhof illustrate strong exhaustivity is given in 
(5), which is a valid inference under the additional assumption that Mary is 
completely aware of what makes up the relevant domain of discourse (a.k.a. the 
Complete Awareness Assumption, Berman 1991). 
 
(5)   Mary knows who was at the party last night.  
   
  Mary knows who wasn’t at the party last night. 
  
Under this second characterization, it is possible to show that predicates like 
wonder  and  ask,  which unlike know,  do not have a proposition embedding 
incarnation, can support strong exhaustive inferences. 
 
(6)   Mary wonders/asked who was at the party last night.  
    
  Mary wonders/asked who wasn’t at the party last night. 
 
While predicates like know, find out, remember, wonder, ask, inquire, etc. 
(can) support strongly exhaustive inferences, there is a subset of QEPs which 
have been argued to support only weakly exhaustive inferences. Among these 
verbs one finds 'emotive' factives (like surprise and disappoint) and 'epistemic' 
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1991, Heim 1994, and Sharvit 2002). 
  Heim (1994) offers the following observation about surprise. Assume that 
for any proposition p, it surprises x that p amounts to asserting that x expected not 
p and that it surprises x Q expresses the same relation, but between x and the 
proposition that is the complete true answer to Q. If question embedding surprise 
(Q-surprise)  could receive a strongly exhaustive interpretation, Mary's past 
mistaken expectation relative to one absentee from the party should be sufficient 
to make the sentence in (7) true: 
 
(7)  It surprised Mary who was at the party last night. 
 
In other words, if Q-surprise had a strongly exhaustive semantics, the following 
inference would be incorrectly predicted to be valid (under the background 
assumption that the relevant domain of discourse includes only Mark, Susan and 
Bill and that Mary is aware of this): 
 
(8)  Susan, and Bill were at the party, Mark wasn’t. 
Mary had expected Susan, Bill, but also Mark to be the party. 
   
  It surprised Mary who was at the party last night. 
 
While the above inference is intuitively invalid, the inference in (9) is valid, thus 
suggesting that Q-surprise is only weakly exhaustive. 
 
(9)  Susan, and Bill were at the party, while Mark wasn’t. 
  Mary had expected that Bill would not be at the party 
   
  It surprised Mary who was at the party last night. 
  
Substituting negative expectations with ‘negative’ wishes, one can construct the 
same argument for disappoint. 
  Finally, Sharvit (2002) suggests that the unacceptability of examples like 
(10) indicates that also some epistemic factives such as predict 100% correctly 
are only weakly exhaustive (for similar arguments regarding realize and 
anticipate see Berman 1991, Beck & Rullmann 1999, and Guerzoni & Sharvit 
2007): 
 
(10)  John didn’t predict 100% correctly who would be admitted. 
#For example Bill wasn't admitted and John didn’t predict that. 
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Following Heim (1994) most existing approaches analyze QEPs as attitudes 
towards a complete (i.e. exhaustive) answer to the question they embed, but 
assume that there are two types of complete answers these verbs can refer to: the 
‘weakly exhaustive’ answer, which is the proposition that is the semantically 
congruent true complete answer to the question in a given world; and the 
‘strongly exhaustive answer’, that is the proposition that the weakly exhaustive 
answer as defined above is the complete answer to the question in that world. 
Assuming a Hamblin/Karttunen extension of questions (i.e. the set of propositions 
that count as possible instantial answers in a given world, which I abbreviate as 
“Q(w)” below), Heim (1994) defines these two notions of answer as follows: 
 
(11)  a.  For any question Q and world w: 
 ans1(Q)(w) = {p: pQ(w) & wp}  
  
b.   For any question Q and world w: 
 ans2(Q)(w) = {w': ans1(Q)(w) = ans1(Q)(w')}  
 
  These two distinct notions of exhaustive answers are central to two current 
views on the distinction between predicates that can be strongly exhaustive (like 
know) and predicates that cannot (like surprise  and  realize) (c.f. Beck and 
Rullmann 1999 and Sharvit 2002). Specifically, these approaches, analyze the 
‘strongly exhaustive’ vs. ‘weakly exhaustive’ distinction, as follows: weakly 
exhaustive QEPs denote attitudes towards ans1, while strongly exhaustive 
predicates are viewed as attitudes towards ans2. Verbs which seemingly can but 
do not have to support strongly exhaustive readings are viewed as ambiguous 
between a lexical entry referring to ans1 and a lexical entry referring to ans2. 
Verbs like surprise are viewed as univocally denoting an attitude towards ans1, 
the weakly exhaustive answer.  
  The predictions are correct. For example, suppose that Bill and Sue and no 
one else called Mary on August 15, 2007 in the actual world (@), then in @, ans1 
to the question who called Mary on August 15, 2007? is the proposition that Bill 
and Sue called her on that day, and knowing  ans1 amounts to knowing  this 
proposition. This knowledge is compatible with the mistaken belief that also Mark 
called Mary on August 15, 2007. For someone to know ans2 to the question, 
instead, is to know that the proposition that Bill and Susan called on August 15, 
2007 is the COMPLETE answer to the question who called Mary on 08/15.07 in 
@. This knowledge is not compatible with mistaken beliefs about individuals who 
didn’t call Mary on that day in @.  
  Although this view is descriptively adequate, it does not yet provide a 
principled explanation of the weak vs. strong distinction. This is so because it 
reduces the impossibility to support strongly exhaustive inferences  (which I will 
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offers no explanation of the latter.1 
  In addition, this view inevitably misses an important generalization: all 
and only univocally weak QEPs generally disallow whether-complements (Lahiri 
1991, Guerzoni 2003, Guerzoni & Sharvit 2006): 
 
(12)  *It surprised Mary (/Mary realized) whether Bill called.  
  
A theory where the only constraint on the predicates under discussion is 
that their lexical semantics cannot make reference to ans2 cannot account for facts 
like (12), because nothing in this theory would prevent surprise or anticipate to 
embed  whether  questions under an ans1 semantics. Given this, such a theory 
would need to find an explanation for (12) that is independent from its 
explanation for the weak exhaustivity problem. In other words, under this view, 
the fact that the same class of verbs is subject to both the weak exhaustivity 
problem and to the constraint against whether complements would fall out as a 
mere coincidence. 
However, there are very good reasons to believe that weak exhaustivity 
and the ban against whether complements are two sides of the same coin.  
This is because when yes/no questions are concerned, the ans1 vs. ans2 
distinction is neutralized. Specifically, the ans1 to a yes/no question is already its 
strongly exhaustive answer. Let us see why. 
 The possible answers to a yes/no question of the form whether p are two 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions, that is p and  p. Since 
they are mutually exclusive (that is for every world only one out of p or  p is 
true), all the worlds where p is true are worlds where p is the COMPLETE true 
answer to whether p (ans1) and vice versa. Thus the proposition p and the set of 
worlds where p is the complete true answer to whether p are one and the same set. 
Given this, in every world w where p is true, p represents both ans1 and ans2 to 
the question whether p. (13) is a formal proof of this claim: 
 
(13)  For any world w and proposition p, such that  w p, 
 a.  Ans1 ([[ whether p ]] ) (w) = {q: q([[ whether p ]] ) (w) & wq} = 
   {q: q {p,  p} & wp} = {q: (q = p or q=  p) & wq} 
 =  {q: q= p}  =    {p}   = p 
 b.  Ans2([[ whether p ]] ) (w) =  
 {w’:  ans1([[ whether p]] )(w) = ans1([[ whether p ]] ) (w’) }  
  = {w’: p = ans1([[ whether p]] ) (w’) } = {w’: w’  p} = p 
  
                                                 
1The alternative view I proposed in Guerzoni (2003), which derived the weakly vs. strongly 
exhaustive distinction from different selectional properties of different QEPs, does not fare better 
in this respect (see footnote 3). 
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ans1 and ans2 to whether p in that world. (The proof is analogous to the one in 13, 
and I leave it to the reader).  
Finally, since p and  p are also jointly exhaustive (i.e. for every world w 
at least one out of p and    p has to be true) the following holds for any w and 
any p: 
 
(14) ans1 ([[ whether p ]] ) (w) = ans2 ([[ whether p]] ) (w)    
 
Given this, each possible answer to a whether question is per se already 
strongly exhaustive and therefore the inability of verbs like surprise  and 
predict(n%) correctly to embed such questions must be related to the 
incompatibility with strongly exhaustive answers these verbs exhibit when they 
embed wh-interrogatives.2 
  The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account for this general 
incompatibility.   
 
 
3.  Outline of the Proposal 
 
The account I am about to illustrate derives both restrictions on weak QEPs from 
a systematic incompatibility between meaning and implicatures of any sentence in 
which one of these QEPs ends up expressing an attitude towards a strongly 
exhaustive answer (be it due to the presence of whether or to the reference to 
ans2).    
Focusing for the time being on to the case of yes/no questions, let us see 
what the basic idea is.  
  We can start with the observation that each weak QEP comes in a 
proposition embedding incarnation (PE) as well and that any sentence where a 
QEP with a PE counterpart embeds a whether question (as in the examples in 15a 
and 16a below), has two more informative alternatives (15b, c and 16b, c) where 
its PE counterpart embeds the two possible answers to that question.    
 
                                                 
2In Guerzoni (2003), I phrased this latter general point in slightly different terms. Specifically, 
I proposed that strongly exhaustive interpretations are always the result of the presence of a 
(possibly unpronounced) whether, rather than coming from the reference to ans2 (and weak 
interpretations result from the absence of whether, accordingly). In fact, the denotation of a wh- 
question containing a hidden whether is, just like the denotation of simple yes/no  question, 
inherently strongly exhaustive (i.e. its ans1 is its strongly exhaustive answer). Within this 
perspective, the above generalization can be simply rephrased as a ban against whether 
complements under the QEPs under discussion. An explanation of why these QEPs in particular 
should be subject to such a restriction was left for further research. The pragmatic account 
suggested below turns out to be compatible with both a question based view, like the one I 
adopted in Guerzoni (2003), and with the answer based view discussed in this section. 
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b.  It surprised/disappointed Mary that Susan was at the party  
c.  It surprised/disappointed Mary that Susan wasn’t at the party. 
 
(16)  a.   Mary knows whether Susan was at the party. 
b. Mary  knows  that Susan was at the party  
c.   Mary knows that Susan wasn’t at the party.  
 
The general idea is that if the one knows which one or (15b) or (15c) is 
true, there is something intuitively very odd about asserting a sentence like (15a) 
instead. In fact this choice would be perceived to be inconsistent.  
Formally, the utterance of any sentence where one of these QEPs embeds 
a whether question triggers the implicature that the speaker is uncertain about 
each more informative alternative. In the case of weak QEPs, the assertion and its 
presuppositions instead imply that the speaker is certain about one of the 
alternatives, thus contradicting the implicature. In the case of strong QEPs the 
uncertainty implicature will be shown to be compatible with assertion and 
presuppositions and therefore harmless. It is the presence vs. absence of this 
contradiction, I will argue, that accounts for the contrast between (15a) vs. (16a). 
The distinctive property of weak QEPs that explains this difference is that 
they carry the presupposition that the speaker is informed about the true answer to 
the question they embed (Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007).  
 
 
4.  Weak QEPs and whether 
 
4.1.  Speaker Factivity 
 
Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) (G&E henceforth) suggest that all weak QEPs carry 
the presupposition that the speaker knows the complete true answer to the 
question they embed and dub this property “speaker factivity” to distinguish it 
from “subject factivity”, which is the presupposition that the attitude holder 
knows the true answer.3  
The examples below show that two otherwise very similar predicates like 
find out and realize differ precisely this respect: Find out, which can be strongly 
exhaustive, can be felicitously used when the speaker doesn’t know the answer to 
the embedded question. Realize, which is only weakly exhaustive, cannot be used 
in such circumstances.  
    
                                                 
3While G&S already indicate that the unavailability of strongly exhaustive readings must be 
related to speaker factivity, they leave it as an open question what exactly the nature of this 
correlation is.   
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before. Her friend John wasn’t there either. Mary picks up the phone, calls 
John, and starts inquiring… 
a.   M: Hi John, so have you found out who was at the party? 
b.  M: # Hi John, have you realized who was at the party? 
  c.   J: No, sorry, I haven’t yet found out who was there. 
d.  J: # No sorry, I haven’t yet realized who was there. 
 
That this is a felicity condition rather than part of the assertion is 
confirmed by the fact that it is preserved in questions (as shown in 17b), and 
under negation (as shown in 17d). 
G&S suggest that emotive factives like surprise and disappoint come with 
the same presupposition. Indeed, native speakers find that there is something 
extremely odd about an utterance of any of the sentences in (18), if the speaker 
doesn’t know who passed the exam.  
 
(18)  a.   It will surprise/disappoint Bill who passed the exam. 
  b.   Will it surprise Bill who passed the exam?  
  c.  It is surprising/disappointing who passed the exam. 
 
My informants’ judgments relative to an utterance of (19), under the same 
circumstances, are less solid.  
 
(19)  It surprised/disappointed Bill who passed the exam.     
 
  Since at this time I have no explanation for this, I will adopt the 
assumption that also emotive factives are speaker factive and leave it as an open 
question what precisely is going on in cases like (19).  
 
4.2.  Semantics and Pragmatics of "Realize Whether"  
 
This Section focuses on Q-realize, as a representative example of the class of 
epistemic factive weak QEPs, and proposes an explanation of how speaker 
factivity prevents these predicates from embedding whether complements.   
As mentioned in Section 3, for every example such as (20a), there are two 
alternatives (20b, c), which asymmetrically entail it. 4     
 
(20)  a.  *John realized whether Mary passed the exam. 
    b.  John realized that Mary passed the exam. 
    c.  John realized that Mary didn’t pass the exam. 
                                                 
4I assume here that the semantics of the question itself, being it the set of possible answers, is 
what makes there alternatives contextually available. 
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semantic relation, it is important to compare the two meanings of realize in its 
question embedding and proposition embedding incarnations (which I will refer 
to as Q-realize and p-realize, respectively).  
  Let us consider these two meanings in turn. We know from Section 4.1 
that Q-realize comes with a speaker factivity presupposition. In addition, x 
realized Q appears to carry the presupposition that prior to the event time, x did 
not know the true answer to Q.5 Finally, x realized Q asserts that at the evaluation 
time x believes the true answer to the question.  
  In order to formally define the semantic contribution of Q-realize 
described above, I will adopt Kaplan’s two step semantics, according to which 
each expression 
 has two levels of meaning: a “character”, that is a function 
from contexts to intensions (I refer to this function with “[[  ]] $”) , and, in any given 
context c, an intension (i.e. “[[ 
]]  $ (c)”), which is a function from points of 
evaluation (i.e. pairs of worlds and times, such as <wi, ti>) to truth values. In 
addition I will assume that each utterance context c is a triple <wc, tc, sc>, such 
that sc is the speaker in the world wc at the time tc. Given this, we can define the 
lexical entry for Q-realize as in (21) below.6  
 
(21)  For every individual x, context c (such that c = <wc, tc, sc>), point of 
evaluation <wi, ti> and set of propositions Q: 
 a.    [[  Q-realize]] $   ( c)(<wi, ti>) (Q) (x)  is defined iff 
 (i)  in  wc, at tc ,sc believes ans(Q)(wc) and  Speaker Factivity 
    (ii) For all t'<ti, it is not the case that x believes ans(Q)(wc) at t'.  
b.   If defined, [[  Q-realize ]]  $ (c) (<wi, ti>) (Q) (x) = 1 iff 
  x believes ans(Q)(wc) in wi at ti  
 
Turning now to p-realize, x realized p carries two presuppositions as well; that p 
is true (i.e. it is factive) and that x did not know the proposition expressed by p at 
some time prior to the evaluation time;7 the assertion is that x knows the 
                                                 
5That this component of the meaning of p-realize  is presupposed rather than asserted is 
confirmed by the fact that it is preserved under negation and in questions: 
(i)    a.  Bill will realize who is at the party.   > Bill doesn’t know who was at the party    
         b.   Bill won’t realize who is at the party  > Bill doesn’t know who was at the party. 
  c.   Will Bill realize who was at the party?  > Bill doesn’t know who was at the party 
 
 
6Since in the case of polar questions the ans1 / ans2 distinction is irrelevant, I left the ans 
operator in the above lexical entry unmarked assuming that it can stand for any of ans1 or ans2. In 
the discussion of wh-complements below the distinction will become relevant, and this lexical 
entry will be modified as to refer to either ans2 or ans1, depending on the reading to be captured. 
 
7That this is a presupposition is confirmed by the fact that it is preserved under negation and in 
questions: 
(i)    a.   Bill won’t realize that I was at the party   >Bill doesn’t know that I was at the party 
  b.   Will Bill realize that I was at the party?   > Bill doesn’t know that I was at the party 
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contribution of p-realize is given in (22). 
  
(22)  For every individual x, context c, point of evaluation <wi,ti>, and   
proposition p: 
a.   [[ p-realize]] $  ( c) (<wi, ti>) (p) (x)  is defined iff 
 (i)    p  (<wc, tc>) = 1 and           Factivity 
    (ii) For all t' < ti, it is not the case that x believes p at t'. 
  b.  If defined, [[  p-realize ]]  $ (c) (<wi,ti>) (p) (x) = 1 iff 
  x believes p in wi at ti  
 
It is evident that, because ans(Q)(wc) is a proposition, the second 
presupposition and the assertion of Q-realize and p-realize are analogous. The 
only significant difference between the two verbs is that while Q-realize is 
speaker factive, p-realize is factive simpliciter.  
Let us see how this affects the semantic relation between the sentences in 
(20). First, in a given context c, (20a) presupposes (23b) and asserts (23c). 
 
(23)  a.  *John realized whether Mary passed the exam. 
 b.  Presuppositions:  
  (i)  the speaker knows whether Mary passed the exam in wc 
              (ii) before  the  time  of  the  event,  John  didn't  know  whether  Mary 
passed the exam.  
c.  Assertion:  
  At the event time John knows whether Mary passed the exam 
 
Second, assertions and presuppositions of (20b) and (20c) in c are those 
given in (24) and (25) respectively.   
 
(24)  a.   John realized that Mary passed the exam. 
b. Presuppositions: 
    (i)  Mary passed the exam in wc  
  (ii) Before the event time John didn’t know that Mary passed the exam  
c.  Assertion:    
  At the event time John knows that Mary passed the exam 
    
(25)  a.   John realized that Mary didn't pass the exam. 
b. Presuppositions: 
   (i)  Mary didn't pass the exam in wc  
  (ii) Before the e. time John didn’t know that Mary didn't pass the exam  
c.  Assertion:    
  At the event time John knows that Mary didn't pass the exam 
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why.  
First, whenever (24a) is true (and therefore defined) the following holds: 
(i) it is common knowledge in the utterance context that Mary passed the exam 
and that John didn't know this, and (ii) John knows at the event time that Mary 
passed. Given (i), it follows that (iii) the speaker must know whether Mary 
passed, and it must be the case that, at some time before the event time, John 
didn't know whether she did. Given (ii), it follows that (iv) John knows at the 
event time whether Mary passed. Given (iii) and (iv), (23a) is defined and true. 
Therefore whenever (24a) is true, so is (23a).  
Second, the same relation holds between (25a) and (23a). If (25a) is 
defined the common ground entails that Mary didn't pass the exam and John used 
to be unaware of this, thus (23a) is defined as well.  Moreover, the truth of (25a) 
entails that at the event time John knows whether Mary passed, which makes 
(23a) true. 
Finally (23a) entails neither (24a) nor (25a), because (23a) can be true in 
worlds where Mary passed the exam, and thus where (25a) is undefined; or in 
worlds where Mary didn't pass, and thus where is (24a) undefined.   
This semantic relation holds in general: If p expresses a proposition and   
p its negation, each sentence of the form x realized that p and x realized that p, 
asymmetrically entails the sentence x realized whether p.  
Given this, we predict that any utterance of x realized whether p will 
generate the two following primary quantity implicatures: (i) the speaker fails to 
believe x realized that p and (s)he  fails to believe that x realized that  p. In (26) 
I illustrate these two implicatures by employing Gazdar's certainty operator K 
(see Garzdar 1979).8      
 
(26) a.   K x realized that p 
 b.     K x realized that   p 
 
Notice that these two implicatures are perfectly compatible with each 
other. But let us see if they are compatible with the meaning and presuppositions 
of the utterance that triggers them. In the discussion below I will use the 
following abbreviations: I will use R(p), R( p), and R(whether p), to refer to x 
realized that p, x realized that  p, and x realized whether p respectively. 
                                                 
8I follow Sauerland 2004 and call these implicatures “primary”, as to distinguish them from 
the “secondary” implicatures in (i), which follow from the primary implicatures only under the 
assumption that the speaker has an opinion relative to the truth of x realized that p.  
(i) K  x realized that p, K  x realized that  p 
A difference between primary and secondary implicatures that is fundamental to my analysis is 
that while secondary implicatures can be suspended when they contradict the assertion, primary 
implicatures cannot (see Sauerland 2004).  
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that either R(p)  or  R( p) is true, whichever is defined. Moreover, speaker 
factivity guarantees that the speaker also knows whether p is true or not. It 
follows that (s)he knows which one of R(p) or R( p) is defined.9 Given this, a 
cooperative speaker can utter R(whether p) only in contexts where either (s)he is 
certain that R(p) is true or (s)he is certain that R( p) is. Thus (27b) holds as well. 
 
(27)   a.  K (R(p) R( p)) 
 b.    K  R(p) K R( p) 
 
However, (27b) and the implicatures we derived in (26) are incompatible.  
 
(28)  a.   K (R(p)  K R( p))      
            b.    K R(p)   K R( p) 
 
   
  
Given this, any utterance like John realized whether Mary passed the 
exam, when defined, systematically triggers primary implicatures that are 
incompatible with its very meaning. Since these primary implicatures cannot be 
suspended (see Sauerland 2004 and footnote 8) the contradiction cannot be 
avoided or repaired. I propose that the unacceptability of (20a) follows from this 
systematic impossibility for any speaker to utter this sentence without incurring in 
a contradiction. 
This proposal makes the following additional prediction. Notice that in the 
absence of speaker factivity, the inference from (27a) to (27b) would be invalid, 
and, since (27a) and the implicatures in (26) are mutually compatible, no 
contradiction would emerge. Therefore this account correctly predicts that QEPs 
that are not speaker factive (like know) can embed whether complements. 
 
4.3.  Semantics and Pragmatics of "Surprise Whether" 
 
As mentioned in Section 1, besides epistemic factives, the class of QEPs that 
cannot embed whether-questions includes also emotive factives like surprise and 
disappoint. This section shows that the proposal I made in Section 4.2 can be 
straightforwardly applied to emotive factives as well. I will discuss only a 
representative case of this latter class, namely Q-surprise, but the analysis extends 
to the other predicates of this class as well.   
  Just like in the case of Q-realize, a sentence in which surprise embeds a 
whether-question has two stronger alternatives: the two sentences where p-
                                                 
9For the sake of simplicity, I leave aside the second presupposition of S(p) (i.e. that x knows p) 
and of S( p) (i.e. that x knows that  p). This is not going to affect the proposal.  
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example:  
 
 (29)  a.  *It surprised John whether Mary passed the exam.   
  b.   It surprised John that Mary passed the exam  
  c.   It surprised John that Mary didn't pass the exam. 
 
In order to see why the p-embedding alternatives are stronger than the Q-
embedding case, let us compare the meanings of Q-surprise and p-surprise.  
Recall from Section 1.1 that Q-surprise asserts that prior to the event time 
the subject expected the negation of the true answer to the embedded question. In 
addition, Q-surprise carries two presuppositions: the presupposition that the 
speaker knows the true answer to the embedded question (“speaker factivity”), 
and the presupposition that at the event time also the subject knows this answer 
(“subject factivity”).10 (30) provides a formal definition of this meaning. 
 
(30)  For every individual x, context c, and point of evaluation <wi, ti>:  
  a.   [[  Q- surprise ]]  $ (c) (<wi, ti>) (Q) (x)  is defined iff 
   (i)  sc believes ans(Q)(wc)   Speaker factivity 
   (ii)  at  ti , x believes ans(Q)(wc) 
b.  If defined, [[  Q-surprise ]]  $ (c) (<wi,ti>) (Q) (x) = 1 iff 
  There is a t'<ti such that x believes  ans(Q)(wc) at t’ 
  
P-surprise asserts that prior to the event time the subject expected the 
negation of the embedded proposition and carries the presuppositions that the 
embedded proposition is true and that at the event time the subject believes it. 
Thus the lexical entry of p-surprise looks roughly as follows: 
 
(31)  For every individual x, context c, and point of evaluation <wi, ti>:  
  a.   [[  p-surprise ]]  $ (c)  (<wi, ti>) (p) (x)  is defined iff 
 (i)  p(wc)=1  Factivity 
 (ii)  at  ti , x believes p 
b.  If defined, [[ p-surprise ]]  $ (c) (<wi, ti>) (p) (x) =1  iff 
  There is a t'<ti  such that x believes p at t’ 
  
                                                 
10The fact that this component of the meaning of Q-surprise is preserved as such under 
negation and in questions, confirms that it is a presupposition. 
(i)   It surprised Mary who passed the exam.  > Mary knows who passed the exam 
It didn’t surprise Mary who passed the exam > Mary knows who passed the exam 
Did it surprise Mary who passed the exam? > Mary knows who passed the exam 
This is true also for disappoint and other emotive factive QEPs, while it is not for epistemic 
QEPs (factive or non factive) such as Q-realize, Q-know etc. 
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realize and p-realize, they stand in the same relation the latter two entries were 
shown to stand in; that is, because ans(Q)(wc) is a proposition, the assertions and 
the subject factivity presuppositions of Q-surprise and p-surprise are fully 
analogous. The only substantial difference between the two predicates is that the 
former is speaker factive and the latter is factive simpliciter. Given this, we 
expect the relation between the p-embedding examples and the Q-embedding 
example in (29) to be the same as the relation between the parallel cases involving 
realize: each of (29b) and (29c) asymmetrically entail (29a), and, in general, any 
sentence of the form It surprised x that p or It surprised x that p (which I will 
abbreviate as S(p) and S(p), respectively) asymmetrically entails the 
corresponding sentence It surprised x whether p, which I will abbreviate as 
S(whether p).     
I leave it to the reader to verify that the two lexical entries support these 
prediction and turn directly to showing why an utterance of S(whether p ) in any 
context where it would be felicitous, leads to a contradiction. 
Since  S(p) and S(p)  are stronger than S(whether p), an utterance of 
S(whether p) generates the primary implicatures listed below in (32a). In addition, 
the assertion of S(whether p)entails (32b) and, following the same reasoning as in 
Section 4.2., (32b) together with speaker factivity leads to (32c).  
 
(32) a.  K S(p),  K S(p)    
 b.  K  (S( p) S(p)) 
 c.    K  S( p)  K S(p) 
     
What we have arrived at is totally parallel to what we derived in the case 
of realize, and just like in that case, (32c), together with the primary implicatures 
in (32a), leads to a contradiction. Here is why.   
 
(33) K  (S(p) K S( p)) 
K S(p)   K S( p)   
   
    
 
5.  Weak vs. Strong Exhaustivity 
  
The question that remains to be addressed is why the QEPs under discussion 
cannot receive strongly exhaustive interpretations (i.e. the problem of weak 
exhaustivity). This section illustrates how the account just presented can be 
extended to this problem. Due to space limitations, I will concentrate on Q-
surprise.    
Following the same line of reasoning adopted above, I start from the 
observation that also when Q-surprise embeds a wh-question (e.g. 34a) there are a 
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these alternatives are twice as many as there are individuals in the relevant 
domain of discourse minus one.11 If, for simplicity, we assume a small domain, 
say a domain containing only Bill and John, the alternatives to (34a) are (34a, b, 
c, and d): 
 
(34)  a.  It surprised Mary who passed the exam. 
  b.  It surprised Mary that John passed the exam and Bill didn't. 
  c.   It surprised Mary that John and Bill passed the exam. 
  d.  It surprised Mary that John didn't pass the exam and Bill did. 
 
For the sake of the argument, let us now assume that (34a) could receive a 
strongly exhaustive reading. In order to capture this, the lexical entry of Q-
surprise proposed in Section 4.3 needs to be slightly modified as to make 
reference to ans2 (see footnote 6). The result is (35) below. 
 
(35)  For every individual x, context c, and point of evaluation <wi, ti>: 
 a.    [[  Q-surprise]] $(c) (<wi, ti>) (Q) (x)  is defined iff 
 (i)  in  wc, at tc ,sc believes ans2(Q)(wc) and   Speaker Factivity 
   (ii)    x believes ans2(Q)(wc) in wi at ti  
b.   If defined, [[  Q-surprise ]]  $ (c) (<wi, ti>) (Q) (x) = 1 iff 
  For all t'<ti,  x believes  ans2(Q)(wc) at t'. 
  
  Due to space limitations, I leave it to the reader to verify that this lexical 
entry and the lexical entry for p-surprise given in Section 4.3 correctly lead to the 
prediction that (34b) and (34c) and (34d) each asymmetrically entail (34a). and 
that, in general, if the relevant domain is the set  {John, Bill}, each sentence of the 
form It surprised x that John passed the exam and Bill didn’t, It surprised x that 
John and Bill passed the exam, and It surprised x that John didn’t pass the exam 
and Bill did (which I will abbreviate as S(J & B),  S(J & B),  S(B & J), 
respectively) asymmetrically entails It surprised x who passed the exam (which I 
will abbreviate as S (who P)).  
  Given this, any utterance of S (who P) generates the ignorance 
implicatures listed in (36a), while its assertive component entails (36b). In 
addition, speaker factivity relative to ans2 amounts to the condition that the 
speaker knows whether John passed the exam and whether Bill did, that is (36c).  
 
(36) a.  K S(J & B), K S( J & B), K S(B & J) 
 b.  K  (S( J & B) S(J & B)  S(B & J)) 
                                                 
11I assume that Mary realized that no one passed the exam is automatically excluded as an 
alternative to (34a), because (34a) carries the additional presupposition that someone passed the 
exam.   
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  (36b) and (36c), in turn, entail (37a).12 However, (37a) is evidently 
incompatible with the conjunction of the primary implicatures, i.e. with (37b). 
   
(37) a.    K  S(J & B)  K S(J & B) K S(B & J)  
 b.  K S(J & B)  K S(J & B) K S(B & J) 
                                                 
12Here is a formal proof of the claim that (36b) and (36c) entail (37a). 
 
1. K  (S( J & B) S( J & B)  S( B & J))   (Since S(B & J) is defined only if J is false, 
 K  J  sc cannot be certain about its truth and at the  
        same time be certain of the truth of J) 
 K  (S( J & B) S(J & B))  
  
2. K  (S(J & B) S(J & B)  S(B & J)) (Since  S(J & B)and S(J & B) are defined 
 K  J   only if J is true, thus sc cannot at the same time 
     be certain that one of them is true and J is false) 
 K  S(B & J) 
 
3. K  (S(x, J & B) S( J & B)  S (B & J))  
 K  J   K J  
   
 K  (S( J & B) S( J & B))  K    S(B & J)  (from 1 & 2) 
 
4. K  (S( J & B) S(J & B)  S(B & J))   (since S(J & B)) is defined only if B is false,  
 K  B    KB and  S(J & B) and S(B & J) are defined only if 
B 
                     is true, and repeating the reasoning in 1, 2, and 
3)  
 K  (    S( J & B)  S(B & J)) K S( J & B)  
       
5.   K (S(J & B) S(J & B)  S(B & J)) 
 (K  J   K J)   (KB  KB) 
   
 [K(S(J & B)  S(J&B)) KS(B& J)]  [K(    S(J&B) S(B& J)) KS(J&B)] (from  3 & 4) 
 
6.   Assume the following abbreviations: 
 A= S(J & B),  B= S(J&B),  C = S(B& J) 
 
7.   Given 6, what remains to be proven is the following equivalence:  
     [K (A B) KC ]  [K (B C)  KA]  =   KA  KB  KC 
 (NB:  (i)  S(J & B ), S(J&B), S(B& J)are mutually exclusive, thus any conjunction of A, B,  
and C is a contradiction; and (ii) K is a certainty operator, thus for any p, r, KpKr = K (pr))  
   [K(AB)  KC]  [K(BC)]  KA] = [[K(AB)  KC]  K(BC)][[K(AB) KC] KA]  
= [K(AB)K(BC)]  [KCK(BC)][K(A B)KA][KC  KA] 
= [K((A B) (B C))][K(C(B C))][K((A B)A)][K(C A)] 
=  [K((A B)(BC))]  [K((CB) (CC)][K(((AA)  (BA)]  
=  [K ((A B)  B))  ((A B)  C)]  KC  KA  
   = [K ((A  B)   (B  B))]   KC  K A 
  =  KB   KC  K A         Q.E.D. 
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  It is this result, I propose, that makes a strongly exhaustive interpretation 
unavailable for Q-surprise. 
  Importantly, this account predicts that a weakly exhaustive interpretation 
of (34)a does not incur in the same contradiction. Since the lexical entry of Q-
surprise that generates a weak interpretation refers to ans1, under such a reading 
of (34)a, speaker factivity simply amounts to (38a) below, instead of (36c) above. 
What follows from (38a) together with the entailment of assertion repeated in 
(38b), is (38c), which is evidently compatible with all the ignorance implicatures 
of the sentence Mary realized who passed the exam (repeated in 39 below).       
 
(38)  a.   K J   KB   K(B J) 
  b.   K (S(J & B)   S(J & B) S(B & J)) 
   
 c.    K(S(J & B)S(J&B))  K(  S(J&B)S(B & J))  K(  S(J&B))   
 
(39)  K S(J & B)  K  S(J & B)  K  S(B & J) 
 
  Finally, notice that without speaker factivity, (37a) would not follow, and 
since the implicatures in (36a) are compatible with each other and with the 
assertion, no contradiction would arise. Given this, the account outlined above 
leads us to a second desirable prediction: predicates that are not speaker factive, 
like know and find out can receive strongly exhaustive readings. 
  One potentially problematic case remains, that is the case where the 
speaker attributes to him or herself knowledge relative to a question  
 
(40)  I know who passed the exam. 
  
In this case what the speaker asserts entails that (s)he knows one of the stronger 
alternatives of the form I know p, where p denotes one of the possible complete 
answers to the embedded questions. Therefore, the assertion here should play the 
same role as speaker factivity above and, as a result, we should predict that (40) 
should not have a strongly exhaustive interpretation, contrary to our intuitions. 
  It is known, however, that self attitude attributions are peculiar in many 
ways. In this particular case, for example, my intuition is that the speaker’s choice 
of uttering (40), instead of its true stronger alternative, is felicitous only in 
contexts where what is relevant is not so much the answer to the embedded 
question, but the identity of those who know about it. If this renders the stronger 
alternative irrelevant, then no implicature should arise. However, I have the 
impression that it is harder to express somebody’s mistaken expectations (with 
surprise) or past ignorance (with realize), if the content of this ignorance or these 
expectations is irrelevant. This said, I will have to leave a fully satisfactory 
understanding of (40) for further research. 
128 Elena Guerzoni 
 6. Conclusions 
 
This paper shows that when speaker factive QEPs embedded whether-
complements or refer in their semantics to a strongly exhaustive answer, the 
resulting meaning and implicatures are incompatible. 
  Therefore, since epistemic factives like realize and predict %correctly are 
speaker factive and under the assumption that emotive factives like surprise and 
disappoint are speaker factive too, the paper provides a unified account for their 
lack of strongly exhaustive readings and their inability to embedding whether 
complements. Since QEPs like know, ask and find out are not speaker factive, this 
account correctly predicts that they can support strongly exhaustive readings and 
can embed whether-complements.  
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